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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
with process; 49 whether the individuals who executed the subpoena are
included in the suit; and which branch of government is abridging the in-
dividual's rights. It now appears that an individual's constitutional rights
rest on precarious grounds. It is not apparent that the Constitution demands
this result. The Court has avoided creating needless friction with legis.
lators, but unfortunately the citizen has gotten the rub.
LINDA M. CASTLEMAN-ZIA
CRIMINAL LAW-WITNESSES-SCOPE OF
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE DEFENDANT
State v. Booth'
Defendant Booth was charged with second degree murder. At trial,
defendant testified about the events leading to the killing and admitted
the act, claiming self-defense. He concluded his testimony on direct ex-
amination by stating that he got into his car and left the scene. Over de-
fendant's objection, the prosecutor was allowed to ask defendant what he
had done with the alleged murder weapon after he left the scene. De-
fendant was convicted and appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals for
the St. Louis District. The court found that the trial court erred in allow-
ing the prosecutor to ask defendant about his disposition of the murder
weapon, because the subject was not referred to either directly or indirectly
in the direct examination and was thus beyond the proper scope of cross-
examination.2 The court held, however, that this was not reversible error,
because defendant failed to preserve the issue for review.3
At common law the defendant in a criminal case was incompetent to
49. "The U.S.S.F., if able to obtain jurisdiction over the New York bank,
might obtain relief. Because the bank is involved in executing the legislative de-
cision but is under no immunity, the court could issue an injunction against it.
The U.S.S.F. could bring an action in New York against the bank under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. But under FED. R. Crv. P. 19 it would have to be determined if
Congress is an indispensable party. Assuming the court would proceed without
the committee, it is questionable that the court would render a decision which
would leave the bank with two conflicting orders to obey. This alternative open
to the U.S.S.F. is unlikely to prove helpful.
A second source of relief would be for the bank to refuse to comply with the
subpoena and thus be held in contempt. Standing problems may be presented
if the bank attempts to assert the organization's defenses. See California Banker's
Assoc. v. Shultz, 94 S. Ct. 1494, 1512 (1974); Note, 88 HARV. L. Rlv. 423 (1974).
1. 515 S.W.2d 586 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
2. See § 546.260, RSMo 1969. Missouri allows wide-open cross-examination
of other witnesses in both criminal and civil proceedings. § 491.070, RSMo 1969.
3. Defendant did not set out the answer he was required to give or state
how he was prejudiced in either his points relied on or his motion for new trial.
515 S.W.2d at 590. See Mo. R. CriM. P. 27.20. The case was reversed for failure
to instruct on self-defense. The court decided the cross-examination question be-
cause it might reoccur at retrial. 515 S.W.2d at 589.
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testify. Missouri first removed this incompetency by statute in 1877. 4 The
Missouri Supreme Court soon held that a defendant who chose to take
the stand under the statute could be cross-examined on any relevant
matter.5 In response, the legislature enacted a statute limiting this wide
scope of cross-examination.6 A defendant or his spouse who chose to take
the stand under the new statute would only be "liable to cross-examination,
as to any matter referred to in his examination in chief." 7 What is a
"matter referred to" has since been the source of considerable litigation,
but is still difficult to determine.8 The difficulty only arises when a
criminal defendant or his spouse takes the stand. In 1905 the legislature
codified the common law allowing wide-open cross-examination of all
other witnesses. That provision is now section 491.070, RSMo 1969.
The rule has not imposed strict limits on the cross-examiner. 9 The
supreme court has continually said that the state is not confined to a mere
categorical review of the direct testimony,10 that the cross-examination may
cover any matter "within the fair purview"'1 of the direct,1 2 and that a
defendant who refers to a subject in a general way may be examined in
detail on4t.'3
In fact, a general denial alone may subject the defendant to a wider
scope of questioning than detailed alibi or self-defense testimony. In
State v. Scown 14 the defendant denied performing an abortion on the night
in question. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to ask a wide range of
questions, most of which asked for explanations of the state's evidence re-
garding defendant's connection with the premises where the crime al-
legedly occurred. The supreme court found that the defendant's statement
on direct amounted to a denial, not just of the crime, but of the state's
evidence as well, and approved cross-examination on those matters.15 In
4. Mo. Laws of 1877, at 356.
5. State v. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 (1878).
6. § 1918, RSMo 1879. The statute is unchanged in its present form, § 546.260,
RSMo 1969.
7. § 546.260, RSMo 1969. "Examination in chief" means the direct ex-
amination.
8. State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo. En Banc 1967); State v. Wil-
liams, 519 S.W.2d 576, 578 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
9. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 190 Mo. 449, 89 S.W. 377 (1905), where a de-
fendant accused of establishing a lottery denied employment by the Mexican
Lottery Company, he could be cross-examined with questions designed to show
he had some connection with the organization. The court said the statute does
not allow a defendant to take the stand, negate the state's evidence by answering
a few carefully chosen questions, and then avoid cross-examination on the issues
thus raised.
10. State v. Dalton, 433 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1968).
11. This refers to what actually was asked on direct, and not what could
have been asked.
12. State v. Harvey, 449 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1970).
13. State v. Scown, 312 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1958).
14. Id.
15. But see State v. Kelley, 284 S.W. 801 (Mo. 1926), which held that de-
fendant's general denial of robbery on direct was not a sufficiently broad refer-
1976]
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State v. Whiteaker16 the defendant claimed amnesia for the period dur-
ing which the crime occurred. The court found no error in allowing the
prosecutor to ask the defendant if he could have killed his wife.17
Whiteaker is an indication that the more general the direct testimony is,
the wider the allowable scope of cross-examination may become.
The limited cross-examination statute provides that the defendant
"may be contradicted and impeached as any other witness." 18 Thus, al-
though the prosecutor 9 cannot attempt to elicit answers covering factual
areas not related to the direct examination, he can ask questions designed
to test the defendant's memory or the accuracy of his testimony.2° For ex-
ample, in State v. Phillips2l the defendant testified on direct that he was
drunk and sleeping in a truck during the commission of the alleged bur-
glary. The court held that he could be asked on cross-examination if he
drove the truck away. Even though outside the scope of direct, the question
was proper as bearing on the credibility of defendant's claim of drunken-
ness. Similarly, a defendant may be cross-examined about a previous con-
fession, even though he did not refer to it on direct examination. 22 If
the defendant asserts an alibi on direct examination, the prosecution can
test his memory by asking him where he was on the same date of a prior
month or year.23 Thus, questions clearly designed to discredit the defend-
ants testimony need not be limited to the scope of direct. However, as the
emphasis of the cross-examination shifts toward the addition of new evi-
dence to the state's case, a closer relationship to the direct examination is
required.
A survey of the cases prior to Booth indicates that few questions are
outside the proper scope of cross-examination and even fewer constitute
reversible error. Those rare cases often involve clear violations of the
statute. An example is State v. Black,2 4 where the defendant was accused
of manslaughter, allegedly effectuated by beating his daughter. His wife2 5
testified about defendant's treatment of their children on direct. It was
held reversible error to allow the prosecutor to ask the wife if the de-
fendant also beat her.26
ence to the incident to allow the cross-examiner to ask if defendant got any
money from the victim and, if so, how. Id. at 802.
16. 499 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 949 (1974).
17. Id. at 419.
18. § 546.260, RSMo 1969.
19. The statute also applies to questions by the court. State v. McClinton,
418 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. En Banc 1967); State v. Grant, 394 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1965).
20. State v. Brown, 312 S.W.2d 818 (Mo. 1958).
21. 480 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. 1972).
22. State v. Kaufman, 254 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. 1953).
23. State v. Abbott, 245 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1952); State v. Davit, 343 Mo. 1151,
125 S.W.2d 47 (1938).
24. 360 Mo. 261, 227 S.W.2d 1006 (1950).
25. Section 546.260 applies to both defendant and his spouse.
26. 360 Mo. at 270, 227 S.W.2d at 1011.
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More common are situations such as the one in State v. Northington.27
On direct, defendant testified that he had six rounds in his revolver be-
fore the encounter and that he shot in self-defense. The court found it
within the proper scope of cross-examination to ask when he loaded his
revolver and where the gun was the afternoon before the shooting. The
decision may have been influenced by the fact that the defendant's answer
to the question, which showed that he was a county constable authorized
to carry the weapon, was favorable rather than harmful to him.
An attempt to summarize the cases and state a general rule delineating
the allowable scope of cross-examination would be fruitless. 28 Many de-
cisions have been expressly limited to their facts and courts have often
disclaimed an ability to add definitiveness to the statute.2 9
Once a question has been found to be outside the proper scope of
cross-examination, the court must determine whether its admission was
prejudicial. The supreme court has stated two apparently conflicting views
on this subject. In State v. McClinton3 o the court said that such cross-
examination is "generally held to ... constitute reversible error."3 1 The
authorities cited were State v. Santino,3 2 which said prejudice would be
presumed absent clear evidence to the contrary, and State v. Pierson,33
which dealt with errors prejudicial under any test.3 4 A year later, the
court again cited Pierson, this time for the proposition that cross-examina-
tion beyond the scope of direct was not grounds for reversal unless "ma-
terial or prejudicial to the accused's substantial rights."35 Thus asking the
defendant if he had been drinking prior to the crime was held not preju-
dicial, because the question was immaterial.30 The trend of the cases seems
to follow the latter rule by implication, but the status of the law is far
from dear.
The handling of the question of prejudice in Booth is of little help
in settling the law in this area. The court avoided a discussion of the
issue by pointing to the defendant's failure to show how he was preju-
diced.3 7 Clearly this was not an application of the rule that prejudice will
be presumed.38 Yet the court, in finding the questions beyond the proper
27. 268 S.W. 57 (Mo. 1924).
28. The courts have not adequately defined what the phrase "referred to"
in the statute means.
29. State v. McClinton, 418 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1967).
20. Id.
31. Id. at 59.
32. 186 S.W. 976 (Mo. 1916).
33. 331 Mo. 636, 56 S.W.2d 120 (1932).
34. Among other things, the prosecutor asked defendant if he was willing
to go into the entire transaction or if there were some matters he would rather
not discuss. Id. at 645, 56 S.W.2d at 123.
35. State v. Moser, 423 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. 1968). The Pierson court had re-
quired that the question be "on a material point or .. .prejudicial to the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant." 331 Mo. at 645, 56 S.W.2d at 123.
36. State v. Moser, 423 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo. 1968).
37. See note 3 supra.
38. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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scope of cross-examination, cited McClinton,39 which purports to follow
that rule.40
The statute provides little protection to the defendant, even when the
trial court sustains his objection to cross-examination on matters not re-
ferred to on direct. When the defendant takes the stand, he waives his
constitutional protection against self-incrimination and has only the
statute to shield him.41 Although there is some suggestion that the outer
limits of cross-examination of a criminal defendant may be constitutionally
imposed,42 no case law requires the statutory rule.43 The United States
Supreme Court has even found a waiver of the right against self-incrimi-
nation by a defendant who voluntarily took the stand in a civil denaturali-
zation proceeding.44 In addition, although the statute may protect the
defendant from the prosecutor's questions, it does not limit what the prose-
cutor may say in dosing argument. Once the accused decides to testify, the
prosecutor, in dosing argument, may "make any legitimate comment upon
his testimony" 45 including the defendant's failure to explain the state's
evidence against him. 40 Thus, the jury is permitted to draw inferences
which-would be improper if the defendant chose not to testify at all.47
_clear ruling is needed to specify when allowing cross-examination to
exceed the proper scope will be reversible error. A presumption of preju-
dice is not warranted because the questions will not always be prejudicial,
as cases like State v. Northington48 show. The requirement that the ques-
tion be on a material point is equally hard to support. A question that
exceeds the scope of direct is no less prejudicial because it is also imma-
terial; in fact, it may be more prejudicial for that reason. A more de-
fensible position would be to require the appellant to demonstrate a clear
likelihood of prejudice from the question. Deciding whether a question
is prejudicial or merely harmless error should be no more difficult in
these cases than it is for other instances of inadmissible evidence.
There appears to be no strong reason for limiting cross-examination
of criminal defendants. In those jurisdictions that limit all cross-examina-
tion, the primary justification for the rule is that it requires the parties
39. See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
40. The same court recently said that such questions were not reversible
error unless "prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused," citing Moser.
State v. Rice, 519 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
41. State v. Scown, 312 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Mo. 1958).
42. C. McCoRMiCK, EvWNscE § 26 (2d ed. 1972).
43. Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), held that defendant's "waiver
is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume
it at will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing." Id.
at 497.
44. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
45. State v. Dxew, 213 S.W. 106, 107 (Mo. 1919).
46. State v. Ayres, 314 Mo. 574, 285 S.W. 997 (1926).
47. § 546.270, RSMo 1969.
48. 268 S.W. 57 (Mo. 1924). See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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to present their facts in order.49 That reasoning has little application to
the Missouri statute because the prosecutor must present his case before
the defendant takes the stand. The statute does not place strict limits on
the prosecutor, who can ask questions relating to impeachment and can
comment in dosing argument on the defendant's limited testimony even
if defense counsel's questions have been carefully designed to restrict the
cross-examination. 50
The effect of the statute is to allow a defendant to make only a par-
tial waiver of his right against self-incrimination, thus affording him
greater protection than the Constitution requires. This additional pro-
tection may be important in at least two situations. First, a defendant
being tried for two or more unrelated crimes may wish to testify as to
one, but not the other. Second, where a defendant asserts an alibi at trial
after remaining silent during arrest and detention, he can avoid ques-
tions like "Why didn't you tell this story to the police?" and thus prevent
the jury from drawing improper inferences from his earlier exercise of
fifth amendment rights. However, these minimal benefits are outweighed
by the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation of the rule. The cases
are so numerous, diverse, and contradictory that there is authority to sup-
port either side of most arguments regarding the proper scope of cross-
examination. In addition, there is no clear rule delineating which improper
questions constitute reversible error. The majority of cases holding a
question or questions improper find that the questions did not con-
stitute reversible error, an indication that the defendant seldom gains any
protection from the statute. In short, the protections afforded a defend-
ant by the statute in its present form do not seem worth the problems
it causes. The two specific advantages mentioned above could be provided
by statute without otherwise restricting cross-examination.51
H. MARTIN JAYNE
49. C. McCol cx, EvmExcE § 26 (2d ed. 1972).
50. See text accompanying notes 18-23, 45-47 supra.
51. See PROP. FED. R. OF Evm., Rule 611, Advisory Comms. note, subdi-
vision (b) (1971), recommending unrestricted cross-examination.
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